

# API design for cryptography



# Who's that **creepy** guy?


Frank Denis  
**@jedisct1**

<https://primulinus.com>

Application **security**, **cryptography**, malware analysis,  
protocol design, computer vision/**digital image processing**...

**OSS** zealot

Spends way too much time on Twitter



Primulinus

**Crypto is everywhere**

**And its domain extends *way* beyond mere encryption.**



how to encrypt stuff in c



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
About 2,960,000 results (0.69 seconds)

### encryption - Simply encrypt a string in C - Stack Overflow

<https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7622617/simply-encrypt-a-string-in-c>

Oct 1, 2011 - I'm trying to **encrypt** a query string on a game I'm making when opening a url. ... I wish I could give a code example but I'm not too experienced in **C**, and I'm not .... I got something going but then some **things** screwed up the url.

### Write a Basic Encryption/Decryption Program in C on Vimeo



<https://vimeo.com/ringneckparrot> Videos

Apr 9, 2012

In this video, we create a simple **C** Program, that performs a very basic **Encryption** and **Decryption**, by ...

### Caesar Cipher in C and C++ [Encryption & Decryption] - The Crazy ...

[www.thecrazyprogrammer.com/2016/.../caesar-cipher-c-c-encryption-decryption.htm...](http://www.thecrazyprogrammer.com/2016/.../caesar-cipher-c-c-encryption-decryption.htm...)

Here you can learn **C**, **C++**, Java, Python, Android Development, PHP, SQL, JavaScript, . ... Get program for caesar cipher in **C** and **C++** for **encryption** and **decryption**. ..... Thanks man ,you're awesome,looking forward for more **encryption** **stuff**.

### How to Write Caesar Cipher in C Program with ... - The Geek Stuff

[www.thegeekstuff.com/2014/08/c-caesar-cipher-example/](http://www.thegeekstuff.com/2014/08/c-caesar-cipher-example/)

Aug 7, 2014 - One simple and basic method to **encrypt** a message is using ... you'll learn how to create a **C** program code that will **encrypt** and **decrypt** the text ...

how to encrypt stuff in c

**All**

Videos

News

Shopping


About 2,960,000 results (0.69 seconds)

# Caesar Cipher in C and C++

[www.thecrazyprogrammer.com/2016/](http://www.thecrazyprogrammer.com/2016/)

Here you can learn C, C++, Java, Python  
program for caesar cipher in C and C++  
awesome, looking forward for more encr

[How to Write Caesar Cipher](#)





1



You can use a variant of *base64* with a custom alphabet, or just a shuffled alphabet. It's not really secure, but in your case it is probably sufficient. The algorithm is widely used, so it will be easy for you to find an implementation where you can provide a custom alphabet.

The bonus point is, that whatever you put into the query string, the encoded form will consist of valid URL characters, if you choose the alphabet appropriately.

[share](#) [improve this answer](#)

answered Oct 1 '11 at 20:14



[Roland Illig](#)

26.1k ● 7 ● 47 ● 88

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
I did a lot of research and think you're right. I got something going but then some things screwed up the url. Is there any resources around with some simplistic c base64 functions? – [Isaiah](#) Oct 2 '11 at 5:41

---

[google.com/search?q=base64+implementation+c](http://google.com/search?q=base64+implementation+c). The implementations I saw are pretty simple to understand. – [Roland Illig](#) Oct 2 '11 at 7:20

---

[add a comment](#)



Or this one is also exceptionally strong.

1

```
char *encrypt_hardway(char *data, char *key) {  
  
    char buffer[PATH_MAX];  
    strncpy( buffer, "", PATH_MAX);  
  
    int i = 0;  
    int y = 0; int o ;  
  
    for(i = 0, y = 0; i <= strlen(data); i++ ) {  
        }  
  
        for(i = 0; i < strlen( data ); i++)  
        {  
            buffer[i]= data[i]-15;  
        }  
  
        size_t len = strlen(buffer);  
        char *r = malloc(len+1);  
        return r ? memcpy(r, buffer, len+1) : NULL;  
    }  
}
```

[share](#) [improve this answer](#)

answered Oct 19 '13 at 13:34



[user1839724](#)

86 ● 2 ● 6



Another very simple XOR algorithm, I'm using it on ATMEL microprocessors to encrypt packets transmitted and received using wireless communication.

1

```
void encrypt_XOR(char *data, char *key) {  
  
    int i = 0;  
    int y = 0;  
  
    for(i = 0, y = 0; i <= strlen(data); ) {  
        int o = 0;  
        for(o = 0; o <= BLOCK_SIZE; o++) {  
            if(data[i] != '') {  
                data[i] ^= key[y];  
            }  
            i++;  
        }  
  
        y++;  
        if(key[y] == '') {  
            y = 0;  
        }  
    }  
}
```

Hope it will help!

[share](#) [improve this answer](#)

answered Jan 25 '13 at 14:30



**Seraphim's**

6,160 ● 10 ● 57 ● 98

⊕ Main Entrance



**EMERGENCY**



**Out Patient  
Drop Off**



**RC4**

**SEED**

**AES**

**GOST**

**DES**

**Twofish**

**Camellia**

**Blowfish**

**RC6**

**CAST-128**

**RC5**

**IDEA**

**RC2**

**3DES**

**RC4**

**CCM**

**OCB**

**SEED**

**CFB**

**AES**

**GOST**

**DES**

**Twofish**

**EAX**

**Camellia**

**CBC**

**Blowfish**

**ECB**

**RC6**

**GCM**

**CAST-128**

**OFB**

**RC5**

**IDEA**

**RC2**

**CTR**

**3DES**

**XTS**

**RC4**

**CCM**

**OCB**

**SEED**

**CFB**

**AES**

**GOST**

**DES**

**56 bits**

**Twofish**

**192 bits**

**EAX**

**Camellia**

**CBC**

**Blowfish**

**256 bits**

**ECB**

**RC6**

**GCM**

**CAST-128**

**OFB**

**RC5**

**128 bits**

**IDEA**

**RC2**

**CTR**

**3DES**

**XTS**

RC4 CCM OCB SEED  
CFB **MAC** AES  
GOST **Padding** DES  
56 bits Twofish 192 bits EAX  
Camellia CBC Blowfish  
256 bits ECB  
RC6 GCM CAST-128 OFB  
128 bits **Yadi** IDEA **Yada** RC5  
RC2 CTR 3DES  
XTS



How to **encrypt** stuff  
in **PHP**?

- o MCRYPT\_3DES
- o MCRYPT\_ARCFOUR\_IV (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_ARCFOUR (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_BLOWFISH
- o MCRYPT\_CAST\_128
- o MCRYPT\_CAST\_256
- o MCRYPT\_CRYPT
- o MCRYPT\_DES
- o MCRYPT\_DES\_COMPAT (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_ENIGMA (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only, alias for MCRYPT\_CRYPT)
- o MCRYPT\_GOST
- o MCRYPT\_IDEA (non-free)
- o MCRYPT\_LOKI97 (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_MARS (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only, non-free)
- o MCRYPT\_PANAMA (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RIJNDAEL\_128 (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RIJNDAEL\_192 (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RIJNDAEL\_256 (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RC2
- o MCRYPT\_RC4 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RC6 (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RC6\_128 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RC6\_192 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_RC6\_256 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_SAFER64
- o MCRYPT\_SAFER128
- o MCRYPT\_SAFERPLUS (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_SERPENT(libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_SERPENT\_128 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_SERPENT\_192 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_SERPENT\_256 (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_SKIPJACK (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_TEAN (libmcrypt 2.2.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_THREEWAY
- o MCRYPT\_TRIPLEDES (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_TWOFISH (for older mcrypt 2.x versions, or mcrypt > 2.4.x )
- o MCRYPT\_TWOFISH128 (TWOFISHxxx are available in newer 2.x versions, but not in the 2.4.x versions)
- o MCRYPT\_TWOFISH192
- o MCRYPT\_TWOFISH256
- o MCRYPT\_WAKE (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)
- o MCRYPT\_XTEA (libmcrypt > 2.4.x only)

# Reference documentation

You must (in **CFB** and **OFB** mode) or can (in **CBC** mode) supply an initialization vector (IV) to the respective cipher function. The IV must be unique and must be the same when decrypting/encrypting. With data which is stored encrypted, you can take the output of a function of the index under which the data is stored (e.g. the MD5 key of the filename). Alternatively, you can transmit the IV together with the encrypted data (see chapter 9.3 of Applied Cryptography by Schneier (ISBN 0-471-11709-9) for a discussion of this topic).



Crypto **is** hard

**\*USING\*** crypto is  
hard, too

This leads to security disasters.

Developers are **not** to  
blame

Crypto is often a  
**necessary**, but **tiny** piece  
in an application

Developers expect things to just **work**.  
Like all other pieces their application depends on.

# Webcrypto API

Noooooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

1. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | sign | verify

2. RSA-PSS

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | sign | verify

3. RSA-OAEP

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | encrypt | decrypt | wrapKey | unwrapKey

4. ECDSA

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | sign | verify

5. ECDH

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | deriveKey | deriveBits

6. AES-CTR

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | encrypt | decrypt | wrapKey | unwrapKey

7. AES-CBC

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | encrypt | decrypt | wrapKey | unwrapKey

8. AES-CMAC

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | sign | verify

9. AES-GCM

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | encrypt | decrypt | wrapKey | unwrapKey

10. AES-CFB

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | encrypt | decrypt | wrapKey | unwrapKey

11. AES-KW

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | wrapKey | unwrapKey

12. HMAC

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | sign | verify

13. DH

- generateKey | importKey | exportKey | deriveKey | deriveBits

14. SHA

- SHA-1 digest | SHA-256 digest | SHA-384 digest | SHA-512 digest

18. CONCAT

- importKey | deriveKey | deriveBits

19. HKDF-CTR

- importKey | deriveKey | deriveBits

20. PBKDF2



...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooo...

...ooooooooo!!!

# NaCl

Funded by the European Commission, released in 2010.

Focused on **high-speed** cryptography  
and improving **usability**.

Restricted to a **small** set of primitives and parameters  
chosen by experts

**High-level APIs** for **common** operations

Optimized for the host it was compiled on, using tricks of  
the C language to save extra CPU cycles

State-of-the-start, simple, **highly secure, high-speed**  
cryptography!

3 years later: **adoption**  
rate remains very **low**





**Tony Arcieri** @bascule · 16 janv. 2013

@hashbreaker what do you think about a simplified version of **NaCl** consisting only of the portable C reference implementations? /cc @\_emboss\_



1



# 2013: libsodium



**Tony Arcieri** @bascule · 20 janv. 2013

@lotharr in case you missed it, libsodium (portable C ref **NaCl** with SUPERCOP Ed25519): [github.com/jedisct1/libso...](https://github.com/jedisct1/libso...) /cc @jedisct1




# Warning: this is **not** a talk about **libsodium**

Libsodium just happens to be a **good case to look at**,  
because **its API has evolved a lot** over time.

Let's see why, how,  
and some takeaways from the past 4 years

**Slow** version of NaCl:  
**Instant success!**



**Usability** was the **#1** problem  
to solve in cryptography

**Not** speed

**Not** security

ಠ\_ಠ(ಠ\_ಠ)

**Cryptography makes devices communicate securely.**

**Cross-platform support** is no more an option.

**Today's minimum expectations:**

**Linux**

**MacOS**

**iOS**

**Android**

**Windows (Visual Studio)**

**Embedded systems**

**Javascript / WebAssembly**

Today's applications are written using **a combination of programming languages.**

**APIs designed for a specific language are problematic.**

**Macros and pointer arithmetic don't play well with (not(C | C++))**

Expose **everything** as  
a **function**

`crypto_box_KEYBYTES -> crypto_box_keybytes()`



**Package** maintainers  
are your best friends

# How developers want to install **dependencies** today:

pkg\_add, apt-get, brew, pacman, choco...

**One pre-built, universal package.**

Mainstream build systems suck. *All of them.*

But package maintainers know how to use them.

And **adoption** of your project **depends on package maintainers.**

Key idea behind NaCl/libsodium: expose  
high-level APIs for common operations

“I want to encrypt a message”

“I want to verify that a message  
hasn't been tampered with”

“I want to store a password”

(and stay cool if my company name ever ends up on [haveibeenpwned.com](https://haveibeenpwned.com))

**Simple** functions that keep the  
amount of user-supplied  
**parameters** down to a **minimum**

```
crypto_box_seal(c, "message", 7, secret_key)
```


# Nobody reads the f\* documentation

What **experts** want: all the gory **details** about the chosen primitives, constructions and parameters

What **everybody else** want: **example code**, code snippets to copy/paste

Also keep in mind that for most people,  
a “**secret key**” means “**a password**”

# Provide examples, *\*then\** explain:



The screenshot shows a web browser window with the URL `download.libsodium.org`. The left sidebar contains a navigation menu with the following items: Introduction, Installation, Projects using libsodium, Commercial support, Bindings for other languages, Usage, Helpers, Secure memory, Generating random data, Secret-key cryptography (with sub-items: Authenticated encryption, Authentication, AEAD constructions: ChaCha20-Poly1305, Original ChaCha20-Poly1305..., IETF ChaCha20-Poly1305 con..., XChaCha20-Poly1305 constr..., AES256-GCM, AES256-GCM with precompu...), Public-key cryptography (with sub-items: Authenticated encryption, Public-key signatures, Sealed boxes), Hashing (with sub-items: [Generic hashing](#), Short-input hashing).

## Generic hashing

### Single-part example without a key

```
#define MESSAGE ((const unsigned char *) "Arbitrary data to hash")
#define MESSAGE_LEN 22

unsigned char hash[crypto_generichash_BYTES];

crypto_generichash(hash, sizeof hash,
                   MESSAGE, MESSAGE_LEN,
                   NULL, 0);
```

### Single-part example with a key

```
#define MESSAGE ((const unsigned char *) "Arbitrary data to hash")
#define MESSAGE_LEN 22

unsigned char hash[crypto_generichash_BYTES];
unsigned char key[crypto_generichash_KEYBYTES];

randombytes_buf(key, sizeof key);

crypto_generichash(hash, sizeof hash,
                   MESSAGE, MESSAGE_LEN,
                   key, sizeof key);
```

### Multi-part example with a key

**Watch** how people use  
your APIs **in their own**  
**projects**

**Watch yourself** struggle  
when using that very API  
**in your own projects**

# How libraries are used in real-world projects

`crypto_box()`: everybody writes **wrappers**.

`crypto_sign()`: everybody writes **wrappers**.

**Vulnerability** in early Golang bindings due to a misunderstanding of the API.

**OpenSSL**: `libtls` + a bazillion incompatible **abstraction layers** in all programming languages. Either close to the metal and dangerous, or completely **different from the original API**.

If people write wrappers,  
your API could be improved

**Watch** what people are  
building with your APIs

Watch for **recurring  
questions** on Github,  
Stackoverflow, etc.

If something is **not available** out of the box,  
people will **reinvent** it.

So, implement it.

“It’s only 1 or 2 **trivial lines of code**, I’m **not** gonna add yet another set of APIs just for that [very **common** feature request]”

/me, not so long ago.

# Reality check

- Adding a trivial function is **not** always **bloat**. It can be well worth it.
- It will improve **code clarity**, prevent bugs.
- It will save you from having to **answer the same questions over and over again**.
- It will make users **aware** that this operation is actually **possible**.

# Libsodium examples

- `crypto_box_keygen()` to **create a secret key**.
- `crypto_box_seal()` to **delete the secret key** after encryption.
- `crypto_kdf()` for **key derivation**.
- `randombytes_deterministic()` for **deterministic random numbers**.

All of these are small and trivial functions, yet turned out to be welcome additions.

# High-level APIs frustrate power users

Expose low-level APIs as well, with access to more parameters.

Documentation should remain focused on high-level APIs.

Do not expose specific implementations,  
or you'll be screwed later.

**Adding new primitives, new constructions:**

**Does it solve a common  
problem impossible to  
solve with the current APIs?**

# Adding new operations

Build a distinct project, maintained independently.

Experiment with new APIs. Wait for feedback. Watch how these APIs are being used.

Or if people use them at all.

Look at how people solved similar problems. Tweak the prototype. Use-it in your own apps. Tweak it again.

Eventually, port it to the main project (or not).

Example: blobcrypt

Again:

**Watch** how people use  
your APIs **in their** own  
**projects**

**Watch yourself** struggle  
when using that very API  
in **your** own **projects**

# Nonces (IVs)

Supplement the secret key.

Must be unique for a given key.

The security of most nonce-based ciphers can be totally destroyed if not.

**Shall a crypto API require nonces from applications?**

# Yes:

- Some **protocols** mandate specific nonces
- Nonces can be used to avoid **replay attacks**/associate questions with responses in non-pipelined protocols
- Come on, anyone can generate random data and maintain counters!

# No:

- Users are too stupid to generate nonces (that's what "misuse resistance" stands for, right?)
  - **Not exactly.**



# Why “No” should be the answer today:

- Requires **redundant code**, that APIs could avoid.
- People don't have time to read **documentation**. Documentation can be misleading or incomplete.
- Maintaining counters is **complicated** in today's world where apps run in the cloud, in multiple **containers sharing** the same **secret keys**.
- Different ciphers have **different requirements** and security guarantees. Random nonces may not be secure. Ditto for counters. Protocols defining nonce constructions may be broken. **APIs should hide these details and do the right thing instead of blaming users for “misuse”**.
- **iOT/embedded systems**: safely generating unique/random numbers may not be possible at all.

**CVE-2017-13079**

**CVE-2017-13085**

**CVE-2017-13086**

**CVE-2017-13088**

**CVE-2017-13080**

**CVE-2017-13081**

**Krack**

**CVE-2017-13078**

**CVE-2017-13083**

**CVE-2017-13084**

**CVE-2017-13082**

**CVE-2017-13087**


**CVE-2017-13077**

# Context separation

Reusing a **secret key** for **different purposes** can have **catastrophic implications.**

Applications will not do that, right?

# It may not be obvious at all:



# Shall we **blame** the **developers?**

Or could APIs prevent that?

Modern crypto APIs should  
consider **context separation.**

As of today, no major library does.

# Key exchange

Insufficient: provide a **DH function**.

Actually worse: provide a **DH function** + a lot of **documentation** about how to use it right.

Better in theory: use **TLS**.

Hell's kitchen: **reimplement** a well-known AKE.

Playing with fire: invent a **custom protocol**.

Juggling with unlocked hand grenades blind-folded:  
**reimplement TLS**.

# Limitations

# No Practical Limitations

(from an API perspective)

Documentation make library developers feel guilt-free,  
but doesn't fix actual problems.

# libhydrogen

Started as a **lightweight crypto** library for **microcontrollers**/constrained environments.

Also an opportunity to design **new APIs** based on lessons from the past, and current trends in cryptography.

# Key concepts:

- **Everything** is built upon only two modern cryptographic building blocks: the **Gimli** permutation and the **Curve25519** elliptic curve.
- Concise, **consistent**, easy-to-use, **hard-to-misuse** high-level API.
- **One key size** for all operations.
- Context (**domain separation**) required by virtually all APIs. **One context size** for all operations.
- Do **not** assume that a CSPRNG is available, or works as expected.
- Implement what applications **frequently** use in other libraries.

# A **single API** for all your **hashing** needs

HMAC construction

Hash function for short messages

Hash function with 128 bit output

Hash function with 256 bit output

Hash function with 512 bit output

XOF or KDF + stream cipher



**One** generic hashing API

Initial libhydrogen prototype: siphash128 + blake2S +  
blake2SX

Today: one sponge function

# **Zero changes** to the API

# Encryption

Don't ask applications for a nonce

Automatically attach a synthetic nonce  
to the ciphertext

“misuse” resistant

# Encryption

Why do applications need **explicit nonces/AD**?

- **Check** that if we expect the 3rd message in **sequence**, what we just received actually is the 3rd message.
- **Check** a **message id**, to reorder fragmented, unordered messages (e.g. UDP datagrams).
- **Check** that a message is not older than a given **timestamp**.
- **Check** a protocol **version**.

# Encryption

Why do applications need **explicit nonces/AD**?

- **Check** that a **value** attached to a message is the one we expect
- **Check** that a **value** attached to a message is the one we expect
- **Check** that a **value** attached to a message is the one we expect
- **Check** that a **value** attached to a message is the one we expect

From an API perspective: no AD, no nonce, but a 64 bit integer

# Encryption

```
hydro_secretbox_keygen(key);
```

```
hydro_secretbox_encrypt(ciphertext,  
    MESSAGE, MESSAGE_LEN, 1,  
    CONTEXT, key);
```

```
hydro_secretbox_decrypt(decrypted,  
    ciphertext, CIPHERTEXT_LEN, 1,  
    CONTEXT, key)
```

# Be consistent

HKDF parameters:  
hash function, salt, key information.

Salt -> context  
Key information -> 64 bit value

**One vocabulary**, same types used across all the APIs.

Even if the underlying **primitives** are more flexible, **simplify their interface** to what most real-world projects actually need.

# Key exchange

Protocol independent

Transport independent

Can be extended

Hard to get wrong

# Key exchange

Bob:

hydro\_kx\_xx1 ( ) -> packet1

Alice:

hydro\_kx\_xx2 ( packet1 ) -> packet2

Bob:

hydro\_kx\_xx3 ( packet2 ) -> packet3

(Optional) Alice:

hydro\_kx\_xx4 ( packet3 ) -> **DONE!**

# Don't reinvent the wheel

Noise

Noisesocket

Strobe

+ well-studied constructions

# Improving security through better abstractions

From:

Many raw crypto primitives and combinators + high level APIs implementing specific protocols

To:

A translation of what primitives can do into what typical applications need. High-level building blocks with a simple, unified interface modeled after real-world use cases.

Requirements: no limitations, MR, domain separation.



# Thanks!

Frank Denis

**@jedisct1**

frank@primulinus.com

<https://libsodium.org>

<https://github.com/jedisct1/libhydrogen>