



FORENSICS ANALYSIS OF iOS MESSAGING APPS

PASQUALE STIRPARO (@PSTIRPARO)

HACKLU

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HOW AND WHERE DATA IS STORED

Starting from iOS8, application data have been separated from their bundles and current directory structure is the following

- **/private/var/mobile/Containers/Bundle/Application/<APP_UUID>/**: This path is the actual path where the application bundle is stored.
- **/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/<APP_UUID>/**: This path is the actual path where most of the application data is stored.
- **/private/var/mobile/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/<APP_UUID>/**: As the name of the folder suggests, this path is the path where applications can store data with the aim of sharing it with other apps or extensions.

File formats are the usual plist files and SQLite databases

WHAT ABOUT DELETED DATA?


- When a SQLite record is being deleted, for performance reasons it is not actually wiped/purged from the database immediately, but marked as free and eventually overwritten later on when that storage space is needed.
- With tools like SQLite-parser [1][2], you can quickly carve out deleted record from SQLite database if not explicitly handled by the developer.
- However, you will find this “feature” in most applications using SQLite storage databases, ... keep that in mind.

[1] – “Python Parser to Recover Deleted SQLite Database Data”, <http://az4n6.blogspot.ch/2013/11/python-parser-to-recover-deleted-sqlite.html>

[2] – “SQLite-parser”, <https://github.com/mdegrazia/SQLite-Deleted-Records-Parser>

DO NOT FORGET THE FADE-OUT EFFECT

- Every time a user presses the Home button or receives a call while using an application, iOS will make a “snapshots” of the current screen in order to be able to do the fade-out effect transition between the two screens.
- **/private/var/mobile/Library/Caches/Snapshots/** for the pre-installed Apple applications;
- **/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Applications/<UUID>/Library/Caches/Snapshots/**, for each third-party application



DO NOT FORGET THE FADE-OUT EFFECT



“SECURE” MESSAGING IN iOS

- WhatsApp, Telegram and Signal among the most widespread applications for instant messaging.
- All of them claim “secure” messaging to a certain extent.
- All of them have end-to-end encryption (data-in-transit), but we will focus on the artifacts left on the device (data-at-rest).

WHATSAPP

- Data is stored in the Shared directory instead of the application data directory
`/private/var/mobile/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/332A098D-368C-4378-A503-91BF33284D4B`
 - |-- `Axolotl.sqlite`
 - |-- `ChatSearch.sqlite`
 - |-- **`ChatStorage.sqlite`**
 - |-- `Contacts.sqlite`
- Some of the tables of interest are:
 - *ZWACHATSESSION*, *ZWAGROUPMEMBER*, *ZWAGROUPINFO* and *ZWAMEDIAITEM*, which stores references to the multimedia files exchanged, indication of the users involved, timestamps, the path where the file has been stored, etc.

WHATSAPP

- *ZWAMESSAGE* contains, among others, the messages exchanged, their timestamp, the name of the user involved in the chat.

Table: *ZWAMESSAGE*

| | iSAI | ZMESSAGEDATE | ZSENTDATE | ZFROMJID | ZMEC | ZPUSHNAME | ZSTANZAID | ZTEXT | ZTOJID |
|----|------|------------------|-----------|----------|------|-----------|-----------|-------|-----------|
| 1 | | 429476024.647006 | | | | | 140 | Pro | 39329 |
| 2 | | 429476038.539024 | | | | | 140 | Pro | 39349 |
| 3 | | 429476152 | | 39329: | | Ric | 140 | Nor | |
| 4 | | 429477100 | | 39329: | | Ric | 140 | Rag | poi |
| 5 | | 429575262.41247 | | | | | 140 | Pro | 39349 |
| 6 | | 429716264.971918 | | | | | 140 | Pro | 39349 |
| 7 | | 429716349.770499 | | | | | 140 | Arip | 39349 |
| 8 | | 429716405.619276 | | | | | 140 | Giu | lta 39349 |
| 9 | | 432568980.222825 | 432568980 | | | | 141 | Hi t | nbe 44797 |
| 10 | | 432569000.474907 | 432569000 | | | | 141 | Pas | 44797 |
| 11 | | 433081774 | | 44797: | | | 141 | 447 | net 39366 |
| 12 | | 433081774 | | 44797: | | | 141 | DFI | 39366 |
| 13 | | 433082195 | | 44797: | | An | 141 | Hi C | |
| 14 | | 433081856 | | 44797: | | Ga | 141 | Just | gro |
| 15 | | 433082599 | | 44797: | | Ga | 141 | Hi A | |
| 16 | | 433350110.17942 | 433350110 | | | | 141 | Hi g | 44797 |
| 17 | | 433350148 | | 44797: | | Ga | 141 | Hey | |
| 18 | | 433351717.501071 | 433351717 | | | | 141 | Car | 44797 |
| 19 | | 433352062.324283 | 433352062 | | | | 141 | Btw | unc 44797 |
| 20 | | 433444570 | | 39349: | | sil | 141 | Cia | |

TELEGRAM

- Like WhatsApp, also Telegram stores many of its data in the *Shared* directory.
- The **tgdata.db** database, under the *Documents* folder, contains all information about contacts, conversations, exchanged files, etc.:
 - `messages_v29` contains the list of all messages exchanged
 - `conversations_v29` contains the list of active conversations as showed in the “Chats” screen of the app
 - `encrypted_cids_v29` contains the conversation ids of the secret chats.

TELEGRAM

```
sqlite> select * from encrypted_cids_v29;  sqlite> select * from messages_v29;
encrypted_id = -1913433264      ...
      cid = -2147483648      mid = 800000023
      cid = -2147483648
encrypted_id = -232713407      localMid = 0
      cid = -2147483650      message = Secret...? :D
      media =
encrypted_id = 2055195409      from_id = 243610671
      cid = -2147483649      to_id = -2147483648
      ...
      ...
```

TELEGRAM

- As expected, also with Telegram is possible to carve out deleted records from SQLite database... but there is one more “feature”.
- **Telegram messages from secret chats are stored in clear** in the `messages_v29` table, like all the other messages.
- On the other hand **we will not find the screen snapshot**, as apparently Telegram properly clears the screen when the fade-out event happens.

SIGNAL

- Less popular than the previous two, but still important to know.
- It delivers what promises: its database **/Document/Signal.sqlite**, containing all its data, **is fully encrypted**. However, two things that are in clear:
 - The attachments exchanged are stored in clear in the **/Document/Attachments/** folder.
 - Screen Snapshots can be retrieved as well. Signal has an option “**Enable Screen Security**” that would prevent this, but for some reason is not set by default.

iOS MESSAGING RECAP

| | WhatsApp | Telegram | Signal |
|---|----------|----------|--------|
| Standard message content in clear? | | | |
| “Secret chat” message content in clear? | n/a | | |
| Sender/recipient information? | | | |
| Timestamps? | | | |
| SQLite carving of deleted records? | | | |
| Snapshot? | | | |

THANK YOU

Pasquale Stirparo, Ph.D.

- Threat Intelligence Analyst and Incident Responder
- Incident Handler @ SANS ISC, Advisor @ Europol EC3
- GCFA, GREM, OPST, OWSE, ECCE

 pstirparo@gmail.com

 [@pstirparo](https://twitter.com/pstirparo)

 <http://www.linkedin.com/in/pasqualestirparo>

 <https://isc.sans.edu>

 <https://github.com/pstirparo/mac4n6>