

We're struggling to keep up

A brief history of Browser Security Features

about:frederik

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

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Why am I here?



02 *The Internet is a global public resource that must remain open and accessible.*



03 *The Internet must enrich the lives of individual human beings.*



04 *Individuals' security and privacy on the Internet are fundamental and must not be treated as optional.*



05 *Individuals must have the ability to shape the Internet and their own experiences on it.*



06 *The effectiveness of the Internet as a public resource depends upon interoperability (protocols, data formats, content), innovation and decentralized participation worldwide.*



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Introduction

The Web and the Browser

The Web is the platform



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Sent Mail

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
New Message

To Cc Bcc

Subject

Send

The Evolution of the Web



XSS is the new Buffer Overflow

Browsers are Everywhere



The Past

“Web browsers' access control policies have evolved piecemeal in an ad-hoc fashion with the introduction of new browser features. This has resulted in numerous incoherencies”

Piecemmeal or “Whac a Mole”



The Past (in a nutshell)

Problem	Band Aid
HTTP is Stateless	Cookies (1994)
Cookies are plain-text	HTTPS (1994)
HTTPS is opt-in	Strict Transport Security (HSTS) in 2009
HSTS needs first-contact	Browser preloads HSTS in 2012

Summarizing



The Present

Secure Hosting of Uploaded Content

Fixing Cross-Site Scripting

How to include potentially untrusted content

The Principle of *not-so-much* Authority

**Give frames access to the things
that are really only necessary**

Iframe Sandbox

```
<iframe src="http://example.com" sandbox />
```

Iframe Sandbox

```
<iframe src="http://example.com"  
  sandbox="allow-scripts" />
```

XSS is still hard to fix

My name is `<script>alert(1)</script>`

Fixing XSS once and for all?

Content Security Policy (CSP)!

Applying CSP

```
<script>
```

```
// fancy animation
```

```
</script>
```



```
<script src="fancy_animation.js"></script>
```

Using CSP

```
Content-Security-Policy: default-src: 'self';  
script-src: 'self' https://cdn.example.com/;  
object-src: 'none'
```


CSP 2.0: Nonces for Dynamic Inline Scripts

```
script-src: 'nonce-blahblahblah'
```

&

```
<script nonce="blahblahblah">  
// dynamic generated JavaScript..  
</script>
```

CSP 2.0: Hashes for static third-party Scripts

```
script-src: 'sha256-blahblahblah'
```

```
&
```

```
    <script>  
// static, third-party JavaScript...  
    </script>
```

Free CSP Introduction & Development Tools!

Towards a Post-XSS World

Mike West
<https://mikewest.org>
G+: [mkw.st/+](https://plus.google.com/mikewest)
Twitter: [@mikewest](https://twitter.com/mikewest)



Slides: <https://mkw.st/r/jsconfeu13>

Making CSP Work for You



Mark Goodwin

<https://computerist.org>
Twitter: [@mr_goodwin](https://twitter.com/mr_goodwin)

Slides: <http://mzl.la/1p6w4vh>

The Future

HTTPS Public Key Pinning

Fixing DOM-Based Cross-Site Scripting

Untrusted, but oh so fast CDNs

**The Situation with Certificate
Authorities is not great**

Request: Add Honest Achmed's root certificate

This is a request to add the CA root certificate for Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates. The requested information as per the CA information checklist is as follows:

Name: Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates

Website URL: www.honestachmed.dyndns.org

Organizational type: Individual (Achmed, and possibly his cousin Mustafa, who knows a bit about computers).

Primary market / customer base: Absolutely anyone who'll give us money.

Impact to Mozilla Users: Achmed's business plan is to sell a sufficiently large number of certificates as quickly as possible in order to become too big to fail (see "regulatory capture"), at which point most of the rest of this application will become irrelevant.

Why do we allow *every CA out there* to create a valid certificate for all domains?

HTTPS Public Key Pinning (HPKP)

```
Public-Key-Pins: pin-sha256="..";  
max-age=15768000; includeSubDomains
```


**Wait a moment, we can fix XSS with
Content Security Policy, but what
about DOM-based XSS?**

DOM Based XSS

```
e1.innerHTML = "<input type='text' value='" +  
    searchFromURLParams() + "' />"
```

Style Injections & Content Exfiltration

Scriptless Attacks

Stealing the Pie without touching the Sill

Mario Heiderich, Felix Schuster, Marcus Niemietz,
Jörg Schwenk, Thorsten Holz
ACM CCS 2012

HGI / Chair for Network and Data Security
Ruhr-University Bochum
mario.heiderich@rub.de || @0x6D61726966F



ECMAScript6 Template Strings: Interpolation

```
var x = 1;
```

```
var y = 2;
```

```
`${ x } + ${ y } = ${ x + y }` // "1 + 2 = 3"
```

ECMAScript6 Template Strings: Multiline

```
var s = `a
  b
  c`;
assert(s === 'a\n  b\n  c');
```

ECMAScript6 Template Strings: Tagging

```
function tag(strings, ...values) {  
  assert(strings[0] == 'a');  
  assert(strings[1] == 'b');  
  assert(values[0] == '42');  
  Return 'whatever';  
}  
tag `a${ 42 }b` // "whatever"
```

ECMAScript6 Template Strings: Tagging

```
function tag(strings, ...values) {  
  assert(strings[0] == 'a');  
  assert(strings[1] == 'b');  
  assert(values[0] == '42');  
  Return 'whatever';  
}  
tag `a${ 42 }b` // "whatever"
```

This gives us an array of all interpolated values!

DEMO

Let's look at this **JS REPL** for the DEMO

Speed trumps Security

```
<script src="//code.jquery.com/jquery-1.11.0.min.js"></script>
```

Locking it down with **Subresource Integrity**

```
<script src="//code.jquery.com/jquery-1.11.0.min.js"  
integrity="ni:///sha-256;C6CB9UYIS9UJeqinPHWTHVqh_E1uhG5Twh-  
Y5qFQmYg?ct=application/javascript"></script>
```


Subresource Integrity and Fallbacks

```
<script src="/static/lib/jquery-1.11.0.min.js"  
noncanonical-src="//code.jquery.com/jquery-1.11.0.min.js"  
integrity="ni:///sha-256;C6CB9UYIS9UJeqinPHWTHVqh_E1uhG5Twh-  
Y5qFQmYg?ct=application/javascript"></script>
```


Conclusion

The Browser can aid the Website

Conclusion



The Evolution of Web Security



github.com/st3fan/moz-stooge

Stooge Scan Results Logged in as fbraun@mozilla.com · Sign out

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Scan results from Tuesday, August 5th 2014

site	status	basic checks	csp checks	ssl checks	bugs
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL - HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL - HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL - HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL A+ HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL F HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL B HSTS SSLRedirect	3
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL M HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL B HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL A HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL A HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL A+ HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL - HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL - HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL - HSTS SSLRedirect	
[REDACTED]	200	XFO XXP XCTO Server	CSP CSP-Valid CSP-Reports	SSL F HSTS SSLRedirect	

github.com/st3fan/moz-stooge

200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	-	HSTS	SSLRedirect	
200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	-	HSTS	SSLRedirect	
200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	-	HSTS	SSLRedirect	
200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	A+	HSTS	SSLRedirect	
200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	F	HSTS	SSLRedirect	
200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	B	HSTS	SSLRedirect	3
200	XFO	XXP	XCTO	Server	CSP	CSP-Valid	CSP-Reports	SSL	M	HSTS	SSLRedirect	

Thank you for listening!

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[#security on irc.mozilla.org](#)



Further reading and Thanks

- [Mike West](#) and [Brad Hill](#) have given presentations about browser security features in the past.
- [Stefan Arentz](#) explained Web Security 101.
- [Mark Goodwin](#) talked about how to make Content Security Policy (CSP) work for you at SteelCon in Sheffield.
- [Devdatta Akhawe](#) et al. wrote about Privilege Separation for HTML5 Applications
- [Mario Heiderich](#)'s research & white papers
- My [Blog post on X-Frame-Options](#) (joint work with Mario Heiderich)
- This presentation also borrows from [my diploma thesis](#) which itself builds on great research as listed in its Reference section (p. 67).
- Thanks to [Pascal “Pepo” Szewczyk](#), [Tim Taubert](#), [Romain Gauthier](#), and [Christian Heilmann](#) for reviewing.
- Sequence Diagrams made with <https://bramp.github.io/js-sequence-diagrams/>